AI audit claims practical breaks in 20 ePrint signature schemes
Martin Feussner reports agent-led cryptanalysis of IACR archive constructions, with ordinary-hardware attacks and a call for independent review.
Martin Feussner has reported that an AI-driven audit of digital signature constructions on the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive has found practical attacks on 20 schemes. The breaks run on ordinary computers, he told the NIST post-quantum cryptography forum, with the longest taking around 18 minutes.
According to Feussner, AI agents carried out the cryptanalysis, implementation, adversarial review, and reproduction. Literature and attack-history searches by those agents turned up no prior published attacks of the stated scope against the specific versions and constructions targeted. The list spans designs including Bittersweet, EagleSignV3, GLYPH, Iceberg, Miraidon-S, Yagisawa's quaternion signature scheme, and fourteen others across pairing-based, code-based, and related proposal styles.
Reports naming affected versions, parameters, and attack conditions, plus code and recorded results, are published for external scrutiny. Feussner welcomed independent human review, reproductions, corrections, and pointers to any missed prior work.